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Abstract 
In the transition economies of emerging markets in China, the external institutional environment greatly influences 
the business of company besides the strategies, governance and other factors. In this study, the effects of external 
governance mechanisms of different ethnic groups on the performance and diversification of groups were 
investigated from the viewpoints of governmental intervention and regulation of the industry . The study provides an 
important guideline for the supervision departments of government and state-owned enterprises about participating 
and managing their strategic decision-making effectively, which has important implications for the development and 
adjustment of future government policies. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, synergy and core competence of corporate diversification was emphasized and unrelated 
diversificat ion strategy was no longer stressed by enterprises in the Western countries. In the same period, 
highly diversified  conglomerates became appeared in the countries of Asia. It seemed to be confused that 
the emergence and the prevalence of the Asian conglomerate were investigated through the Western 
diversificat ion theory. Can the diversification of the western theory exp lain  the diversification o f Chinese 
enterprises? Does the diversificat ion of Chinese enterprises have its unique development incentives? How 
does special institutional background of Chinese transition economies affect  and promote the 
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diversificat ion of Chinese enterprises? Where is the way  of d iversification for Chinese enterprises with 
the change of institutional environment? These issues will be researched in this study. 
2. Literature Review 
In the large enterprise groups, there exists asymmetric informat ion, interest conflicts between the 
parent company and subsidiaries, cross -subsidies and inefficient investment strategies and other issues , 
which maybe further worsen the relationship between diversification and performance. However, 
members of the corporate  may also obtain potential benefits from the d iversification of group in the 
background of emerging markets. Transaction cost theory considers that the optimal structure of company 
depends on its institutional background [1]. Background of the American system can be described as 
having well-functioning capital, labor and product markets [2]. However, there are a series of market 
failure phenomenon caused by informat ion, agency problems in the emerging markets, such as China, 
India and Brazil [3, 4]. Because of the lack of effective functioning of intermediaries in emerging markets , 
high cost must be paid for the finance, technology and senior managers . In addit ion, the cost for making a 
brand and building a contractual relationship with partners is high due to the imperfections of market in 
the product market. Under this background, a company as part of group or an intermediary  between 
independent companies and the imperfect market operates in the business, which is the most profitable [5]. 
China is in the current period of transition economies  and the legal environment is still relatively 
weak, which  result in a wide gap with the market  economy of Western country in the grade of market 
maturity [6]. The market has something to do with the development of companies. However, the 
development of companies is largely dependent on the policies of government and the allocation of 
resources [7, 8]. Since the development level o f legal sys tem or other elements of market  is lagging 
behind, government regulation instead of the legal system as an alternative mechanis m can promote the 
development of companies and society [9]. Chen et al considered that government control can be 
regarded as a complementary mechanism to compensate the lack of legal mechanisms  as the awareness of 
legal protection under the current domestic transition is weak [10]. 
Local government is responsible for the implementation of the central economic policies and 
guidelines. Therefore, whether local governments are willing to distribute the control of the resources in 
the market will significantly affect the level of local economic development [11, 12]. Tax distribution 
fiscal system plays an active role in  standardizing fis cal allocation relationships between central and local 
governments and the power of financial revenue and expenditure gradually transferred from central to 
local [13]. Local governments obtained greater power and initiat ive fo r the allocation of resources, which 
may adopt the local protection method using the administrative power due to the drive of profit when they 
have a larger allocation of resources  and a target of economic interest [14]. Therefore the market 
competition is replaced with administrative control, which results in the Chinese market segmentation and 
local p rotectionism. Lin et al pointed out that the catch-up strategy before reform and opening up resulted 
in Chinese current local protectionism and market segmentation, while the decentralization reform made 
the protectionism evolve into the protective behavior that local government protect local businesses  in 
competitive behavior. The competitive pressure among local governments main ly arises from the higher 
level governments and central government [7]. The reason for this is that the higher level governments 
and central government control the scarce resources  which the local government needs . Due to the 
informat ion asymmetric, the central government develops a set of evaluation system for the decision-
makers of local government in order to effective supervis e and restrain the local governments, which 
results in the fierce competition among local governments inevitably. 
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3. Research methods 
3.1 Sample selection and variable definition 
The listed companies of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share from 2004 to 2008 were selected as 
samples in this study. The largest shareholder and controlling shareholders  of all A-share listed company 
were investigated using the method Claessens adopted according to the stake information disclosed by 
annual reports of listed companies  as well as news, media and various web reports . 
The basis data used in this study originates from the Wande, Guotai Junan, Xenophon databases and 
annual reports of listed companies . The data related with rights division of state-owned and private 
property and strategy and governance is from the collection and calculat ion. Diversification of family 
groups was divided into three types: horizontal diversification, related diversificat ion and unre lated 
diversificat ion based on the Rumelt’s classificat ion. The evaluation for Corporate Governance Index 
(CCGINK) arises from the "The Research Report of Corporate Governance Evaluation of Chinese Listed 
Companies". The business performance of company was evaluated by main business profitability ROA. 
In addition, some variables such as financial leverage (Leverage), firm size (Size), t ime to market (IPO)  
were also added in this study. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 is the descriptive statistics for strategy and characteristics variables of key members of the 
corporate of samples. Results show that the mean of ZC and median were 6.465 and 5, respectively. The 
standard deviation, min imum value and maximum value were 6.975, 0, and 64, respectively. The mean 
and median of variable o f industry control (HG) were .318 and 0, respectively. The corresponding 
standard deviation was 0.466. The mean  and median  of the ult imate controller of the property (CQ) were 
0.156 and 0, respectively. The corresponding standard deviation was 0.363. The mean and median of 
company performance (ROE) were 0.156 and 0, respectively.  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables of all samples 
Variable ZC CQ HG SCALE ROE GROWTH LEV 
Mean 6.465 0.156 0.318 21.687 0.286 1.146 0.529 
Mid 5.000 0.000 0.000 21.589 0.069 0.145 0.529 
SD 6.975 0.363 0.466 1.216 9.309 0.330 0.243 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.616 -17.700 -0.998 0.000 
Max 64.000 1.000 1.000 27.344 351.458 272.635 3.016 
First 1/4 3.000 0.000 0.000 20.855 0.016 0.000 0.386 
Last 1/4 8.000 0.000 1.000 22.336 0.1426 0.324 0.654 
Data was calculated by spss13.0 software. 
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4. Empirical Results and discussion 
The samples were divided into three groups according to the degree of intervention by the 
Government. The relat ionship between diversification strategy and corporate performance was 
investigated under the government intervention of different degrees. The industry and annual factors  were 
controlled in the regression analysis . By exp lanatory variable is ROE and exp lanatory variables include 
G-DIV-H (horizontal diversification strategy), G-DIV-X (related d iversification strategy), LEV (financial 
leverage), SCALE and GROWTH, just as shown in Table 6. 2. Results of regression show that the 
relationship between G-DIV-H and ROE was not significant for the samples which had less government 
intervention. Similar relationship can be concluded for the s (G-DIV-X and ROE. For the samples with 
moderate government intervention, the coefficient between G-DIV-H and corporate performance is -
0.061 and t value is -3.730. The significant negative correlation can be seen at the 1% level, which means 
that the corporate performance is worse once G-DIV-H was selected compared with  unrelated 
diversificat ion. The coefficient  between G-DIV-X and  corporate performance is -0.071 and t value is -
4.483. The significant negative correlation can be seen at the 1% level, which means that the corporate 
performance is worse once G-DIV-X was selected compared with unrelated diversification. For the 
samples with high government intervention, the coefficient between G-DIV-H and corporate performance 
is 0.088 and t value is 6.870. The significant positive correlat ion can be seen at the 1% level, which 
means that the corporate performance is better once G-DIV-H was selected compared with unrelated 
diversificat ion. The coefficient between G-DIV-X and corporate performance is 0.151 and t value is 
12.932. The significant positive correlation can be seen at the 1% level, which means that the corporate 
performance is better once G-DIV-X was selected compared with unrelated diversification. 
Table 2 Effects of diversification strategy and marketing degree on the company performance. 
Variable High Medium low Samples 
Intercept 
-0.666*** 
(-12.286) 
-0.480*** 
(-5.362) 
-0.389*** 
(-3.464) 
-0.505*** 
(-12.429) 
G-DIV-H 
0.008 
(1.340) 
-0.061*** 
(-3.730) 
0.083*** 
(4.799) 
0.009 
(1.479) 
G-DIV-X 
0.002 
(0.216) 
-0.071*** 
(-4.483) 
0.141*** 
(9.768) 
0.031*** 
(5.812) 
CQ -0.033*** (-5.838) 
0.099*** 
(7.481) 
0.056*** 
(4.951) 
0.039*** 
(6.338) 
SCALE 
0.035*** 
(14.454) 
0.036*** 
(9.315) 
0.018*** 
(3.589) 
0.028*** 
(15.027) 
GROWTH 
0.000*** 
(-6.524) 
0.027*** 
(4.628) 
0.050*** 
(4.236) 
0.000* 
(-1.739) 
LEV 
0.045*** 
(2.759) 
-0.463*** 
(-12.274) 
0.026 
(1.166) 
-0.070*** 
(-5.219) 
INDUSTRY 
-0.050*** 
(-9.246) 
-0.029** 
(-2.156) 
-0.096*** 
(-11.675) 
-0.055*** 
(-11.423) 
Adj-R2 0.699 0.406 0.546 0.341 
F 88.636 26.912 46.271 60.098 
Data was calculated by spss13.0 software. *, **, *** represent the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions 
In the transition economies and emerging markets of China, the external institutional environment 
greatly in fluences the business of company except fo r the strategies, governance and other factors. In this  
study, the effects of external governance mechanis ms of different ethnic groups on the performance and 
diversificat ion of groups were investigated from the v iewpoints of governmental intervention and 
regulation of the industry. The study provides an important guideline for the supervision departments of 
government and state-owned enterprises about how to participate effectively and manage their strategic 
decision-making, which has important implications for the development and ad justment of future 
government policies. Because most of the data are annual reports  of listed companies need to be manually 
collected and calculated for meeting the need of large samples in the empirical analysis , it is maybe 
difficulty to define accurately the unique features of listed companies . 
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